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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH~ by and through its
ROAD COMMISSIQ)J~
P lairttiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 9079

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD C0:\1PA);Y~
a Delaware corporation~
Defendant and AppellanL

BRIEF OF

RESPOKDENT~

This appeal has been brought by the Denver and Rio
Grande Western Railroad Company, hereinafter referred
to as Rio Grande~ from a judgment of condemnation of the
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2·

Pistrict Court of the Third Judicial D istrict:P wherein title
to real property over which Rio Grande maintained a
branch line~ otherwise known as Little Cottonwood Branch
'
was vested in the Road Commission of the State of Utah,
hereinufter referred to as Road Commission~ The facts sur~
rounding the case are not specifically at issue nor do we
disagree 'vith Appellant~s statement. However, in order
to meet and properly refute the· allegations of Rio Grande~
we do deem it of importance to set forth the nature of the
Cil se along with the basic facts which made it requisite
for the Road Commission to condemn the subject property~
s~rA TEMEI\T

OF FAC·TS

The Road Commission~ pursuant to the Federal Aid
Highviay Act of 1956, after comprehensive surveys and
research, drew and projected plans for the construction
and establishment of a public improvement, to wit, a state
high\vay, it being designated as a portion of the Federal
.ll_id Inter~tate Highway,. Route 1 and technically identified as Project ~ o. I-0 1-7 (3).
V\Tith few exceptions, the location and termini of the
interstate freeway were identified and settled through the
Salt Lake 'lalley as early as the year 1950~ ~~ s the freeway
enters the valley at the .Jordan Narrows., it proceeds gen-

erally in a northerly direction, passing without the main
business districts of municipalities~ This hl ghway ~ 'vi th its
multipJe Janes and complex interchanges ig subject in
eonstruction and design to strict standards, pursuant to
the Federal Aid Hlgh,vay .A.ct and the regulations of the
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Federal Bureau of Public Roads. One such standard incumbent on the Road Commission provides that no other
structure, road or avenue, inclusive of railroad tracks} shall
cross the interstate freeway at grade level. A further maxim calls for the complete control of access to and from
the freeway. Such freeway, as it extends through the City
of Midvale, is immediately adjacent and to the east of the
mainline tracks of Rio Grande. (R~ 18) A small spur line of
Rio GrandeJ known as Little Cottonwood Branch, crosses
the alignment of the interstate freeway and progresses in
an easterly direction for approximately 1.75 mile, (R. 24)
,~~here it services two customers on the east side of State
Street. Uttle Cottonwood Branch is c·ontiguous to Center
Street in 1\..Jidvale and due to a limited amount of traffic on
the branch, the right of way was used for v-ehicular traffic
also.
It was initially proposed to improve and widen Center
Street} leaving the branch trackage in place. Since the
right of way of the Little Cottonwood crossed over the
projected course of the free\vay~ a grade separation of some
nature was mandatory+ Road Commi~sion authorities
quickly rejected a proposal to construct a freeway overpass
above I .. itt1e Cotton\vnod Branch and Center Street for
se\'~eral cogent and outstanding reasons:
( 1) The anticipated cost of an overpass structure ex~

ceeded $200,000, ~·hich was admittedly several times
the value of Little Cot ton wood Branch; (R. 1 f:l)
(2) The overhead structure would obliterate sight
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i bility for vehicular traffic proceeding along Center
Street in a w_esterly direction, prohibiting a safe approach to the Rio Grande mainline and thus creating
a dangerous and hazardous intersection; (R. 20)
~3)

Center Streett a part of the state highway system
and under the jurisdiction of the Road Commission,
was in dire need of improvement and widening in
order to facilitate present and future vehicular traffic)
and the right of way of Little Cottonwood was within
the area of the proposed improvement. {R. 14')
Using this rational as a basis~ it was determined~ in
order to eliminate the expense and hazardous conditions
of a freeway overpass and to provide for the improvement
of Center Street} that Little Cottonwood Branch should
be acquired by purchase or othenvise and that an underpass shou1d be realized on Center Street beneath the
interstate freeway and the mainline of Rio Grande. Such
detennination was effectuated by a condemnation resolution of the Road Commission subsequent to unsuccessful
negotiations between the interested parties+ Such resolution provides in part:
·~RBSOI.-(VED by

the State Road Commission of
Utah that it finds and determines and hereby declares that;
'The public intere~t and necessity require the
acquisition~ construction and completion by the
State Road Commission, of a public improvement~
namely a State Highway * * *
4
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~~That

portion of proposed highway contained
within a strip of land approximately 270 feet wide
adjacent to the easterly right of way line of the
main line track of the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroadt being designated as a portion of the
Federnl Aid Interstate Highway~ Route 1 and
identified as Project No. I-01-7 (3), is planned and
located in a manner which will be most compatible
with the greatest public good and the least private
injury and has been heretofore designated as a
limited-access facility as provided by Chapter 63~
Laws of Utah 1945; the balance being the improvement and ytidening of Center Street in £ididvale
City, Salt Lake County, identified as State Project
1

1

1580~

**

:t:

of the right of way of the Little Cottonwood Branch of the Denver und Rio Crande West~'All

ern

Railroad~

* * * /'

STATE1viENT

Ob~

POINTS

POINT I
ACQUISITIO~

OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD
BRA!\JCH O·F RIO GRANDE IS FOR A PUBLIC
PURPOSE.
POINT II
THE

RESOL.l~TIOK

OF THb R01\D COTvl~1ISSIO~ TO .A.CQC IRE THE SUBJECl' PROPERTY CARRIES ~A.. PRBSU~\1PIO='f Oli .. VALIDJrl·-y
Al\T_D IS PHl\-L_:\ ~'ACTE E\rlDRXCE OF, 'rHJ:G
F.ACTS THEREl:-.J COI\'TAI='TED.
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POINT III
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS
A PUBLIC USE MORE NECESSARY THAN ITS
FORMER PU-BLIC L:SE AS A PART OF A
RAILROAD.

POINT IV
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT FOR A
POSSIBLE FUTURE L"SE.
POINT V

ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD COMMISSION
OF LITTLE COTrrON\VOOD BRANCH IS NOT
FOR AN UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH
COJ\1IviERCE.
POI~T

VI

PARTIES INDISPENSA.BLE TO THE
DETERMINATION OF THE ACTION HAVE BEEN JOINED IN THE CAUSE.
.~LL

CO~PLETE

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ACQUISITION OF LITTLE COTTONWOOD
BRANCH OF RIO GRANDE IS FOR &"- PUBLIC

PURPOSE.
--rhe rule is well settled in substantially all jurisdictions in this country that private property may not be
taken involuntarily unless the use for which the property
i~ acquired i~ public in nature. Basset v . Swenson, 51 Ida.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'i
256~

5 P.2d 722; City of Menlo Park v~ Artino:r 151 Cat
App.2d 261 311 P.2d 135; City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52, 270 P.2d 488; Gravelly Ford
Canal Co. v . Pope arul Talbot Land Co . ~ 36 Cal. App"2d
556~ 178 P~ 150; Gilpin v. Mutual Life Ins. Co~ of New
Y orkj 64 ?\LY .S~2d 436.
1

The Constitution of the State of Utah· negatively limits
the power of eminent domain to those instances where
public purposes are involved. Article I~ Section 22 ~
provides:
''Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use "\vithout just compensation.~'
Legislative authorization in Utah spells out those uses
which are to be considered public uses. See 78-34-1, Utah
Code Annotated 1953~ as amended, a.nd 78-34-3 and 4j Utah
Code Annotated 1953. Although the Legislature may initially declare a particular use to be pub lie, the question
isJ in the final analysis, one for the judiciary. University
of Southern Calif. v . Robbins:- 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 37 P.2d
163. Though there are several tests which have been used
by the courts in arriving at a public use determination~
we are in agreement with Rio Grande~H statement, contained in its brief, that in the case at bar a discussion of
the divergent theories is of no import:
'l* * * for no better example of a public use can
be found than that of a highway, • * *~" .l\ppellanes
Brief, page 127

·rho procurement of property in order to construct
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pub lie high\vays has been traditionally considered a public
use. State v. Fourth Judicial District Court~ 94 Utr 384J 78
P.2d S02; Barnes v~ Wade, 90 Ut. 1, 58 P.2d 297 . As to the
question of what constitutes a public use under the eminent domain statute, the Vtah Supreme Court has allowed
for a broad interpretationL Town of Perry v. Tharn..as~ 82
Ut. 159, 22 P2d. 343.
'rhe interstate free\vay, as it passes through the Salt
Lake Valley, performs the vital function of providing
ready~ quick and safe mode for vehicular traffic. It serves
not only residents of Salt Lake County and Utah but also
citizens of other states and the public in general. In the
design and construction of this facility, the safety and
security that must be afforded to traffic~ not only on the
free\vay i lsel f but also on any connecting or adjoining
avenues, is a primary consideration. The Road Commission
has an obligation in seeing that the interstate freeway is
so con~t.ructed and maintained that dangerous overpasses
and interchanges are reduced to a minimum+
There is abundance of testimony in the record that a
freeV\.'~ay overpass was not considered advisable due to
re strictcd sight distance that would result relative to traffie along Center Street in approaching the main tracks of
Rio Grande. (_R+ 36, ~7) 38.) The appellant~ while admitting
the rigl1t of the Road Commi~sion to condemn, alleges that
only that part of Little Cottonwood which immediately
crosses the path and tertnlni of the interstate freeway is
req ul1·ed and that, therefore, the Road Conim.ission has
exceeded consti tu tiona I limitations in acquiring the entire
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branchj for the remainder is not related to a public use.
Appellant overlooks the fact that the resolution of the
Road Commission cites that the property to be acquired
through condemnation was to be utilized not only for the
Federal Aid Interstate Highway but also for the improvement and \Videning of Center Street in 1\1idvale Cityj which
is part of the state system of highways. Thus, it is seen
that the subject property was acquired for the dual pur~
poses of the interstate freeway and Center Street in ~fid
vale City~ both admittedly public improvements and uses.
POI)J'r II
rrHE RESOLUTION OF ,.rHI£ ROAD COlVIl1ISSION TO ACQUIRE TIIB St~DJECT PUOPERrr'{ CARRTES A PRESUMPIO~ 0}~. VALIDIT.Y
..:-\:-.JD IS PRll\.f~l\ F1\ClE E.\riDEKCE OF TIIE
FACTS THEREIN CONTAINED.

Point I and Point III of Rio Grande's brief allege
that the Road Commission had no authority to condemn
the Little Cotton\vood Branch on the ground that there
'vas no pubJlc purpose connected therewith. The resolution of the Road Commission in turn states that the real
property is essential for public improvements, that the
project has been located and planned in a manner that
i~ most compatible '"'"~ith the greatest public good and the
least private injury~ and that the public interest and nccessit.\· demund that such property be acquired. We believe
it to be the la\v in this jurisdiction that a decision of an
administrative body is entitled to a presumption of cor~
rectness and validity, is prima facie evidence of the facts
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contained~

and must be accepted unless such is
unreasonable or unless the body is arbitrary or capricious,
in which case the burden of showing such rests lNith
that individual who seeks to set the decision aside. Hotel
Utah Co. v~ IndttStrial Comm. 116 Ut. 443~ 211 P42d 200;
Park Utah Cons. Mines Co. v. Indu.strial Comm.~ 84 Ut.
481, 36 P.2d 9794
therein

11

Latimer, J., in writing for this Court in the case of
Goodrich v. Public Service CCJrrnm., 114 Utr 296J 198 P.2d
975, had this to say:
'~We

have repeatedly held that in reviewing

cases certified to this court from the Public Service
Commission on a statement of error that the Commission~s reportt findings, conclusions and order
are unlawful~ we are limited in our review to ascertaining whether or not the Commission had before it substantial evidence upon which to base its
decision. Only in the event that we find the Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably in denying applicant's petition can we set
aside the order.''
The effect of a decision of the Public Service Commission would not be greater in any event~ than a decision
of the Road Commission. Rio Grande has adduced no argument which indicates or in any way evidences that the
resolution of the Road Commission to acquire l.r it tie Cottonwood Branch 'vas arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable~
POINT III

/J...CQUISITION BY THE R01\D COJVIMTSSIO~
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS
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A PUBT. . Tl: USE l\iORE NECESSARY THAN ITS
FOllMER PU·BLIC USE AS A PART OF A
RAILROAD.

If the law announced in this state is that private
property may not be acquired by the condemnor unless
such property be placed to a public use, it is equally settled
that property initially devoted to a public use may be acquired under the eminent domain statute for a purpose
which is of a more public nature . North Salt Lake v. St4
Joseph Water and Irr. Co . ~ 118 UL 600, 223 P+2d 577. This
principle is a matter subject to the wisdom of the Legislature. Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, (Colo.)
248 P.2d 732. In this connection, 78-34-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953~ states in part:
'~The

private property which may be taken
under this chapter includes:

Propert):-- appropriated to public use; pro~
vided, that such property shall not be taken unless
for a more necessary public use than that to "\\Thich
it has been already appropriated.n
~ ~ (3)

See also 78-34-4~ U.C.A. 1953. Railroad property has been
subjected to acquisition for another public use more neces . .
sary. Elberton Southern Ry Co. v. Georgia State Highway
Dept~~ 211 Ga . 838, 89 S.E.2d 645~ Syracuse Grade Crossing
Comm. v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 197 Misc. 192, 97
~'J.Y. 5. 2d 279.

It is beyond argument that the use of the right of way
of Little Cottonwood Branch for the construction of the
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interstate freeway and the improvement and vridening of
Center Street in Midvale constitutes a public use more
vital and necessary than the previous employment as a
bran.ch of Rio Grande~ Traffic anaylses reveal that more
than 8~000 vehicles cross the Cottonwood Branch tracks
on Center Street daily and the projected estimate of future
vehicular traffic along said street will greatly exceed such
sumr (R. 23.) Thls is to be compared with the small rail
truffic which Rio Grande conducts on Little Cottonwood.
POINT IV
ACQUISITIO~ B\~ THE ROAD COMMISSION
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOrr FOR A
POSSIBLE FUTURE USE.

Point II of Rio Grandets brief sets forth that the Road
Commission is not empowered to condemn for possible
future use~ (A.ppellanfs Brief~ p. 14.) :--Jo authority is cited
for such argument nor is; any reasoning put forward to
substantiated this contention. It could be said without reservati on that the \Vord futurej' is relative in scope and
theoretically might apply to any situation wherein the
Road Commission did not utilize the property for high,vay
purposes at the precise moment that it sought to acquire
the parceL Such an interpretation is~ of course, hardly
predicated upon the genuine administration of justice.
Even were we to assume that a future use were involved
in the case at bar, 27-9-4~ l 1 . C.~;\. 1953, provides an effec~
live an s \\-' er ~ far it dec lares that with respect to limited
access facilities~ the highway authorities of the state rna y
acquire land even though the property is not immediately
ff
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needed for the right of way proper if the interests of the
public "Will be best served. Be that as it may~ the instant
situation does not involve the acquisition of property for
future purposes.
It takes not an expert to realize that the planning~
construction~ improvement and maintenance of modernday highways is not an overnight operation~ The surveys,
public hearings, plans and designs:t purchase or acquisition
of right of way leading up to the construction phase is an
intricate and c-om.p lica ted process, requiring years of time
and large outlays of public monies+ The plans and specifications of the interstate freeway have been on the drawing boards and in the conference rooms for ten years. It
would be rash to advocate that acquisition of property, in
order that final. and conclusive plans and specifications
might be accomplished and in order that bids might be
received and con tracts let:t constitutes a future use+
In the absence of procuring Little Cottonwood Branch~
the Road Commission was at a deadend in respect to the
ultimate reconstruction and improvement of Center Street
and iliitial construction of the interstate freeway. A present use was involved .
Although it is not clear~ it appears that Rio Grande
asserts that the course of the interstate freeway is dependent upon the routing of a collateral spur line of Rio
GrandeJ known as the Bingham-Garfield Branch, and that
Little Cottonwood Branch may not, consequently, be necessary for freeway usage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) This
we believe to be a self-molded conclusion, unwarranted
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and unsupported by the record now on appeat No testimony was brought out at any hearing which indicated
that the condemnation resolution of the Road Commission
was a tentative proposal, subject to change at a later time.
POINT V
ACQUISITION BY THE ROAD CQ)L\IISSIOK
OF LirrTLE COTTONWOOD BRANCH IS KOT
i\01
UNLA VJFUL INTERFEREKCE WITH
COI\iMERCE.

Article I~ Section 8, of the Federal Constitution provides that the Congress of the United States shall regulate
commerce among the several states~ This clause has been
interpreted to mean that no state may interfere substantially with the flow of interstate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1, 6 L.Ed. 23; Brown v. Houston~ 114 U.S.
622~ 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L~Ed. 257. Rio Grande maintains
in this action that the acquisition of the Road Commission
of Little Cottonwood Branch establishes an unlawful interference 'vith commerce.
The constitutional prohibition invalidates only those
acts of the ~tate \Vhich substantially and unreasonably
impede and interfere with the conduct of Rio Grande~s
business~ S~ C~ Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.~ 303 l~.S~
177, 58 S.Ct. 510~ 82 L.Ed~ 734. {1/lr. Chief Justice Stone, in
a case v~.rhich Rio Grande cites, declared that:
~'"\Vhen the regulation of matters of local concern is local in chJracter and effect~ and its impact
on the national commerce does not seriously inter-
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fere with its operation, and the consequent incentive to deal 'vith them nationally is slight:t ~uch
regulation has been generally held to be 1-vithin
state authority/' Southern -Pac. Cor v. State of Ariz~_t
~32.5 U . S. 761) 65 S.Ct. 1515.

The acquisition by the Road Commission or Little Cottonwood is of small consequence when rated against the total
volume of business enacted by Rio Grande in Utah and
in neighboring states. So a Iso is the amount of railroad
traffic on the branch minute \vhen paralleled to the public
necessity of well-bui 1tt safely designed and maintained
highways. The case of Kansas Southern Ry. v . Kaw l,..alley
Drairwge District, 233 V~S. 75 cited by Rio Grande, is to
be distinguished from the immediate situation. In that
case Ka\v Valley, under the guise of the police power~
ordered the Railroad to raise the elevation of its bridges
and to remove old bridges. Such r.a~e did not involve the
right of the state of Kansas to condemn a railroad branch
line serving but t\vo customers, but rather centered around
an order to remove, without compensation~ railroad fac ilities. The Supreme Court of the United States held, and
\Ve think justifiably so, that such order constituted a direct
interference \\~ith interstate oommerce. The Kaw Valley
case is to be further distinguished from the instant situation on the basis that the bridges required to be removed
therein \Vere the connecting link of the interstate artery
(lf the Kansas Southern Railroad) V•l hile the Lit tie Cotton\vood Branch is exhausted less than t\vo miles after it
leaves the mainline trackage of Rio Grande.
In Elberton Southern Ry. v. Georgia State Highway
Dept.) 211 Ca~ 838~ 89 S.E.2d 64ft the highway department
1
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acquired by condenmation property formerly devoted to
railroad purposes4 In answer to the railroadts plea that
the eminent domain action brought by the state destroyed
the former's power to perform its public duty as a public
carrier in interstate commerce~ the Georgia court held that
there was no direct and substantial interference with the
conduct of the railroad's operations. The Elberton case is
persuasive authority. The Bd. of Hudson River Regulating
District v+ Forula~ J. & G. Ry. Co., 249 ~.Y. 445~ 164 N.E.
541~ is likewise to the effect that the condemnation of
railroad property for the benefit of a river regulating district is not an unlawful interference with interstate commerce. The· acquisition by the Road Commlssion of LTtah
of Little Cottonwood Branch must be deemed an incidental
interruption of commerce.

POINT VI
ALL PARTIES Il\"DISPENSABLE TO THE
COMPLETE DETERMI~ATION OF THE ACTIO~ HAVE BEEN JOIKED J)J THE CAUSE.
Rio Grande has maintained that its customers whom
it services on the- Little Cottonwood Branch and with
whom contracts are negotiated, are indispensable parties
to this action and obtain a compensable interest in the
subject real property. It would be unjustified to dignify
this assertion by an extended discussion. It is sufficient
to say that the constitution and statutes of the State of
Utah contemplate that the right of eminent domain shall
be exercised as to all recognized interests in the real property acquired. Rio Grande is the sole and exclusive ov.rner
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of the right of way under consideration. We have yet to
find a case \vherein an individual holding nothing more
than a business contract with the condemnee was held to
po~gess a com_pensable and cognizable interest in a condemnation action, and if such were the law, then, quite
naturally, the costs of acquiring any property for highway
purposes would be prohibitive.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of condemnation of the District Court
of the Third Judicial District should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WALTER L~ BL"DGE
Attorney General
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR.

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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